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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
because certain remedies are accorded to the surviving spouse
which operate to prevent this inequitable result. If the surviving
spouse is also the succession representative, he can eliminate
the problem by paying the taxes and then claim compensation
from the heirs when he delivers their virile share to them. Ap-
pointment of anyone else as succession representative practically
insures payment of the taxes, since his discharge is conditional
on payment.82 Finally, if no succession representative is ap-
pointed, and the heirs refuse the pay the tax, the tax collector
has the authority to obtain a judgment and order sufficient suc-
cession property sold to satisfy this judgment.8 3
Conclusion
Although the usufruct of the surviving spouse has decreased
in importance due to the advent of various public and private
programs, it seems that the institution still plays an important
role in affording financial security to the surviving spouse.
Some improvements on the present law may be suggested.
First, the requirement of issue of the marriage should be strictly
construed; second, the court should look to the intention of the
testator to determine what constitutes a disposition adverse to
the surviving spouse; third, the jurisprudence allowing the usu-
fruct to continue after the survivor's remarriage should be dis-
approved; and fourth, the surviving spouse should be required
to post security.
Charles G. Gladney
PROPERTY TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN SPOUSES
Among the numerous articles of the Louisiana Civil Code
dealing with marriage are those governing donations and con-
tracts between spouses. But the code provisions are sketchy
and the jurisprudence slight, especially on the rules affecting
interspousal donations. The purpose of this Comment is to
clarify the law of interspousal transactions generally.
82. See LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 2951 (1960) ; LA. R.S. 47:2407(c)(1950).
83. LA. R.S. 47:2408(b) (1950); id. 47:2409(c).
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DONATIONS
Article 15321 excepts interspousal donations from a number
of rules applicable to ordinary donations inter vivos.2 Donations
between spouses are governed by a special set of rules. Chapters
8 and 9 of Title II, Book III, of the Louisiana Civil Code are
devoted entirely to donations made by marriage contract and
donations made during the marriage. Chapter 8 regulates dona-
tions made by third parties under the marriage contract to the
future spouses, or one of them, and to the future children of the
marriage; chapter 9 regulates donations between spouses either
by marriage contract or during the marriage. Certain rules in
chapter 8, however, for donations by third persons to the future
spouses are made applicable also to interspousal donations.3
Donations made during marriage are the more common today
since the marriage contract is rarely used. However, the rules
applicable to gifts by marriage contract are operative and bear
examination, since they apply to donations of future, and present
and future property between spouses during the marriage.
4
By Marriage Contract
General
Since all marriage contracts must be by authentic act,5 the
formal requirement that inter vivos donations be in authentic
form6 is readily satisfied for donations by marriage contract.
The donor may dispose by marriage contract of the same quan-
tum of his property as the law allows him to give a stranger.7
All such donations fall, however, if the marriage does not take
1. LA. CIVIM CODE art. 1532 (1870).
2. See, e.g., id. art. 1528 (inter vivos donation only comprehends present
property) id. art. 1529 (inter vivos donation made on purely potestative condi-
tion null) id. art. 1530 (inter vivos donation null if made on condition of paying
charges that do not exist at time of donation or are not listed in act of donation) ;
id. art. 1531 (if donor reserves right to dispose of donated object, at donor's death
the object belongs to the donor's heirs).
3. Id. arts. 1744, 1745.
4. Ibid.
5. Id. art. 2.328.
6. Id. art. 1536. Of course, gifts of movables made by delivery are not subject
to any formality. See id. art. 1539.
7. Id. art. 1746; see also id. art. 1734. The disposable portion varies. from
one-third to two-thirds of the donor's property if the donor leaves children at
his death, the amount depending upon the number of children. Id. art. 1493. If
the donor leaves no children at his death, but leaves one or both surviving
parents, the disposable portion will vary from two-thirds to three-fourths of the
donor's property. Id. art. 1494. Compare id. art. 1494 with id. art. 911.
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place.8 Thus present property donated and delivered must be
returned to the donor if he so demands ;9 the other forms of
donations simply lapse and would be unenforcable at the donor's
death.10 Upon the death of the donor the donations are reducible
to the disposable portion."
There is some ambiguity in the Code regarding the need for
the donee to accept a gift made by marriage contract. Article
1540 provides that a donation must be accepted in precise terms
to be effective.' 2 Article 1739 provides that "donations made
by marriage contract can not be impeached or declared void on
pretense of a want of acceptance.' 3 Probably the two articles
can be reconciled by recognizing that since the donee is always
a party to the marriage contract the donation is always accepted
in precise terms.1
4
There are three types of donations that can be made by a
marriage contract: present property, future property, and pres-
ent and future property. A discussion of the rules applicable to
each type follows.
Present
A gift of present property is an ordinary donation inter
vivos 5 by which the donor immediately divests himself of the
thing given in favor of the donee.' 6 Thus the donee immediately
acquires ownership of the thing and unless otherwise stipulated,
this donation is not conditioned on the survivorship of the
8. Id. art. 1740.
9. Daigle v. Fournet, 141 So. 2d 406 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962); Decuers v.
Bourdet, 10 La. App. 361, 120 So. 880 (Orl. Cir. 1929).
10. It is doubtful that the donor would need to sue to enforce this implied
resolutory condition in a donation of future property. There is no jurisprudence
but it appears that the invalidity generally would be urged only as a matter of
defense if the donee later should try to enforce the donation.
11. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1742 (1870).
12. Id. art. 1540.
13. Id. art. 1739.
14. See 5 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAIT-t PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANCAIS no
738 (2d ed. 1957). But see 11 AUBRY ET RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRANUAIS no 735
(6th ed. 1956), indicating the donation does not have to be accepted in precise
terms if. made by marriage contract.
15. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1734 (1870): "Every donation inter vivos, though
made by marriage contract to the husband and wife or to either of them, is
subject to the general rules prescribed for the donations made under that
title ...."
16. Id. art. 1468: "A donation inter vivos, (between living persons) is an
act by which the donor divests himself, at present and irrevocably, of the thing
given, in favor of the donee who accepts it."
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donee.17 Should the donee predecease the donor, the property
will merely be transmitted in the donee's succession. At the time
of the donation, however, the children to be born of the marriage
acquire no present interest in the property donated.""
Future
A donation of future property is a gift of all or part of the
property the donor may leave at his death. 19 Such a donation is
a hybrid, for it has characteristics of a donation inter vivos, as
well as a donation mortis causa. 20 In form, it resembles a dona-
tion inter vivos, since it is made during the life of the donor. In
result, however, it is similar to a testamentary gratuity, ana-
logous to a bequest. In effect, this donation makes the donee
an heir of the donor. It amounts to a contractual institution of
heir and as a matter of fact, that is precisely the name given
to it by the French. 21 Since a donation of future property is a
donation of all or part of a succession not yet opened, no imme-
diate transfer of ownership occurs. The donor retains control
and use of his property but may only dispose of it by onerous
title.2 2 The donor cannot make any further gratuitous disposi-
tions of objects comprised in the donation unless they be of
moderate sums. 23 Is the restriction applicable only to those
specific objects "comprised" in the donation at the time of the
17. Id. art. 1744: "Every donation inter vivos, of present property, made
between married persons by marriage contract, shall not be deemed to be done
on the condition of the survivorship of the donee, if that condition be not formally
expressed, and it is subject to all the rules above prescribed for those kinds of
donations." This rule is to be distinguished from the rules governing donations
of future property which, if made between the spouses, are conditioned on the
survivorship of the donee. See id. art. 1534.
18. Id. art. 1734: "... It can not take effect for the benefit of children not
yet born."
19. Id. art. 1735: "Fathers and mothers, the other ascendants, the collateral
relations of either of the parties to the marriage, and even strangers, may give
the whole or a part of the property they shall leave on the day of their decease,
both for the benefit of the parties, and for that of the children to be born of their
marriage, in case the donor survive the donee.
Such a donation, though made for the benefit of the parties to the marriage,
or for one of them, is always, in case of the survivorship of the donor, presumed
to be made for the benefit of the children, or descendants to proceed from that
marriage."
20. 3 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE (AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY THE
LOUISIANA STATE LAW INSTITUTE) no. 3158 (1959) [hereinafter cited as
PLANIOL].
21. 3 PLANIOL no. 3159 ("institution contractuelle").
22. LA. CIVIL CoDE art. 1736 (1870).
23. Ibid. See also 3 PLANIOL no. 3177. The Code appears to contemplate only
remunerative donations which resemble onerous transfers rather than pure gra-
tuitous ones.
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donation, or does it restrict the disposition of property acquired
subsequently as well? Or does the restriction apply at all if
there are no specific objects named in the donation? According
to the French commentators and the slim Louisiana jurisprud-
ence, the restriction does apply to property acquired subse-
quently, and no specific enumeration of items is required to
cause the restriction on gratuitous dispositions to be operative.
24
An illustration may prove helpful at this point. Assume that a
week prior to marriage, the parties enter into a marriage con-
tract whereby the future husband donates to his future wife
half of all the property he may leave at his death. Although the
precise language of the donation and of article 173525 suggest
that what the wife should get is only half of the estate owned
at his death, the French commentators and the Louisiana juris-
prudence are apparently unanimous that the wife is entitled to
half of all the property he owns on the day of the donation, and
half of all the property he may acquire from that moment on.26
The husband retains the use and enjoyment of the property so
accumulated during his life, but at his death the wife, as con-
tractual heir, is entitled to her half interest as a creditor of his
estate.27 Had the husband made any donations exceeding a mod-
erate sum since the date of the contract, the wife would have a
cause of action to have them reduced by half, or to receive half
of their value if the husband's estate at his death was insuffi-
cient to satisfy the donation.2 8 Had the wife predeceased the
husband, the donation would have lapsed,29 making the hus-
band's estate subject instead to normal succession claims.
24. Riddell v. Riddell, 146 La. 37, 83 So. 369 (1919) ; 15 LAURENT, PRINCIPES
DE DROIT CIVIL FRANAIS nos 212-222 (2d ed. 1876); 4 TROPLONG, DROIT CIVIL
EXPLIQUt no. 2343-2352 (2d ed. 1872).
25. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1735 (1.870) : "Fathers and mothers . .. may give
the whole or a part of the property they shall leave on the day of their de-
cease .
26. Actually the quantum due the wife at the husband's death would be com-
puted as follows: half the property in the husband's estate at his death plus all
property donated by the husband since he instituted his wife as a contractual
heir. Thus if at his death the husband's estate was valued at $50,000 and he
had made $30,000 worth of donations since the date of the contract, the wife is
entitled to half of $80,000 or $40,000. Since the patrimony at his death is
$50,000 the donation can be satisfied without reducing the other donations of
present property which the husband had made during his life. See 5 PLANIOL ET
RIPERT, TRAITIt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANgAIS no 777 (2d ed. 1957); see
also Riddell v. Riddell, 146 La. 37, 83 So. 369 (1919).
27. Succession of McCloskey, 29 La. Ann. 237 (1877).
28. 3 PLANIOL no. 3186; see also note 26 8upra.
29. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1745 (1870) : "A donation of property in future, or
of property present and in future, made between married persons by marriage
contract, whether simple or reciprocal, shall . . . not be transmisaive to the
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Another problem raised by a donation of future property
concerns its revocability. Article 1736 provides that a donation
of future property is irrevocable only in the sense that the donor
can no longer make gratuitous dispositions of the objects com-
prised in the donation, except for moderate sums. 30 This pro-
vision that the donations of future property is irrevocable only
in that one sense raises the question whether such a donation
is. directly revocable. The more reasonable answer seems to be
in the negative for three reasons. First, such a donation is a
donation by marriage contract and the Civil Code provides that
a marriage contract cannot be altered after the marriage.8 1
Since a revocation of the donation after marriage would amount
to an alteration of the marriage contract, it follows that there
can be no revocation. Second, the donor alone cannot revoke
because no contract is susceptible of unilateral alteration.
82
Third, it would completely defeat the purpose of the article to
allow a direct revocation and a new donation to a third party,
while forbidding a tacit revocation by simply making other dona-
tions. It appears, therefore, that a donation of future property
by marriage contract is irrevocable in the ordinary sense.
Since a donation of future property is not a. legacy, it does
not have to be in testamentary form. 3  Further, the donee be-
comes a creditor of the donor's estate and is preferred over
any legatees.34 However, like a legacy, it is reducible to the
donor's disposable portion at his death.35
children, the issue of the marriage, in case of the death of the donee before tha
donor." (Emphasis added.)
See Stratton v. Rogers, 11 La. Ann. 380, 383 (1856) : "If the donor has made
a donation to his wife simply of future property, and he survives her, the donation
will fail, although there was issue of the marriage." But note that where the
donation is made by a third party to one of the future spouses, it is presumed
to be made in favor of the children to be born of the marriage, and consequently if
the donee predeceased the donor, the issue of the marriage will take, not as succes-
sors of their parent, but in their own right as alternate donees. LA. CIVIL CODE art.
1735 (1870). See id. art. 1741; Doucet v. Broussard, 6 Mart.(N.S.) 196 (La.
1827).
30. Id. art. 1736: "A donation, in the form specified in the preceding article,
is irrevocable only in this sense, that the donor can no longer dispose of the
objects comprised in the donation on a gratuitous title unless it be for moderate
sums, by way of recompense or otherwise.
"The donor retains till death the full liberty of selling and mortgaging, unless
he has formally barred himself of it in the whole or in part."
See also note 23 supra.
31. Id. art. 2329.
* 32. Id. art. 1798.
33. Succession of DeBellisle, 10 La. Ann. 468 (1855).
34. Succession of McCloskey, 29 La. Ann. 237 (1877).
35. LA. CIVIL C6nE art. 1742 (1.870). it may also be argued that since the
donee is an heir by contract, he should be entitled to the same advantages regard-
1965]
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Present and Future
. The third type of donation by marriage contract is one made
cumulatively of propertly present and future.3 The Code does
not contemplate a single donation of both present and future
property, but rather a single donation of either present or future
property.37 The donee has a choice, exercisable at the donor's
death, of accepting his share of the donor's property as it existed
either on the day of the donation or on the day of the donor's
death.'8  The choice is available, however, only if there was
attached to the contract a statement of debts and charges out-
standing on the date of the gift.39 If this requirement has been
complied with and the donee elects to take the present property,
he must satisfy the mentioned debts and reject any property
that may have accumulated since the date of the donation. If
the statement of charges is not attached the donee can claim
only the future property.40 If he elects to take the future prop-
erty he must satisfy his pro rata share of the succession debts.41
When the election is made, assuming the choice has been pre-
served, the applicable rules are those pertaining to the type of
donation chosen.
Since the election is not made until the donor's death, the
donor's entire patrimony must be kept intact or its value in some
way represented in the succession. Thus, no gratuitous disposi-
tion may be made of the present property or the property
acquired subsequent to the donation, for the ultimate distribu-
tion is potentially out of both. Onerous dispositions may or
may not be valid, depending on which choice the donee elects.
If the future property is chosen, the applicable rules are those
pertaining to the donation of future property, which allow
onerous dispositions. 42 If the donee elects the "present" property,
ing acceptance of the donation a's an ordinary heir has for accepting a succession.
Trhus he should be able to accept purely and unconditionally (and pay the proper
portion of the donor's debts) or accept with benefit of inventory, or renounce
the entire donation. See id. arts. 1055-1060.
36. Id. art. 1737: "A donation in favor of marriage may be made cumulatively
of the property present and future, provided, that to the act be annexed a state-
ment of the debts and charges of the donor, existing on the day of the donation,
in which case the donee, on the decease of the dorAor, may accept merely the
,)resent property, renouncing the surplus of the property of the donor."
37. 3 PLANIOL no. 3190.
38. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1737 (1870).
39. Ibid.
40. Id. art. 1738.
41. Ibid. See id. arts. 1611, 1614.
42. Id. 'rt. 1736, quoted -at note 30 8upra.
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he is considered as having been the owner since the date of the
donation and may demand the return of "his" property, if it
has been sold.4 8 This rule, while obviously advantageous to the
donee, is also obviously detrimental to a vendee of the donor.
The donation of present and future property, when made by
marriage contract, is irrevocable for the same reasons, dis-
cussed previously, applicable to donations of future property.
44
During Marriage
Historical Background
In early Roman law, donations inter vivos between spouses
were void.45 This prohibition was later relaxed to allow such
donations, but only on the condition of revocability. 46 In French
customary law, on the other hand, the rules varied from prov-
ince to province.47 In some areas only the husband could donate;
in others, neither could. In still other provinces either spouse
could make the donation, but it was subject to revocation. 48
With the adoption of the French Civil Code in 1804 donations
between spouses were authorized, but were revocable at the will
of the donor.49 This principle was incorporated into the Loui-
siana Civil Code of 180850 and remained the law in this state
until 1942.51 Article 1749 permitted revocation even after dis-
solution of the marriage by death or divorce. 52 Consequently,
third persons desiring to acquire property from a donee-spouse
found themselves in an extremely precarious position. The
donor, by revoking the donation, could recover the donated prop-
erty even after it had passed out of the donee's hands. Since
interspousal donations amounted to something less than com-
plete divestiture, the property was considered to remain in the
donor's estate for tax purposes. 58 To eliminate these conse-
43. 3 PLANIOL no. 3194.
44. See text at notes 31 and 32 8upra.
45. 3 PLANIOL no. 3204.
46. Ibid.
47. Id. no. 3025.
48. Ibid.
49. FRENCH CIVIL CODE art. 1096(1),(2).
50. La. Civil Code p. 258, art. 224(1),(2) (1808).
51. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1749 (1870) : "All donations made between married
persons, during marriage, though termed inter vivos, shall always be revocable.
"The revocation may be made by the wife, without her being authorized to
that effect by her husband, or by a court of justice."
52. Succession of Waldo, 156 La. 684, 101 So. 21 (1924).
53. Howard v. United States, 125 F.2d 986 (5tb Cir. 1942).
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quences, article 1749 was repealed and R.S. 9:2351 was enacted,
making all interspousal donations irrevocable unless otherwise
stipulated in the act of donation.5 4 If the right of revocation
is reserved, it may later be renounced by notarial act.55 There
is no. jurisprudence under the new law for situations in which
the, right of revocation has been reserved but it is a logical
assumption that the former rules permitting revocation at any
time would apply 6
General
Although not expressly provided in the Code, it seems that
the spouses may give to each other during the marriage not
Only present property but also future property and present
and future property. Doubt exists however, because the articles
dealing with the latter types of donations made between spouses
speak only in terms of their being made by marriage contract.57
There seems to be no good reason why these donations should
not also be made during marriage. Although there is no direct
authority in point, article 1532 exempts interspousal donations
from the general rule in article 1528 that donations inter vivos
can comprehend only the present property of the donor 58 and
no distinction is drawn in the exemption between donations
made by marriage contract and those made during marriage. In
addition, the title to chapter 9 indicates that the donations dealt
with therein may be made either by marriage contract or dur-
ing the marriage.5 9 Either type, of course, must be made in
authentic form,6° and spouses may donate to one another no
more than they may give to a stranger. 61
54. LA. R.S. 9:2351 (1950) : "Every donation made . . . by a married person
to his or her spouse shall be as irrevocable as if made to a stranger. However,
where the donation is made by notarial act the donor may reserve the right of
revocation by express stipulation therein. Any right of revocation so reserved un-
less renounced as provided in R.S. 9:2352, may be exercised at any time during
the life of the donor, whether or not the marriage is then in existence, and
whether o/" not the donee is then alive."
55. Id. 9:2352.
56. In fact, R.S. 9:2351, in the last sentence, provides essentially the same
rule as existed under the former law. See note 54 supra.
57. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1744, 1745 (1870).
58. LA. CIVIL CoDn art. 1528 (1870) : "A donation inter vivos can comprehend
only the present property of the donor. If it comprehends property to come, it
shall be null with regard to that.".
Id. art. 1532: "The four preceding articles.are not applicable to donations of
which mention is made in the eighth and ninth chapters of the present title."
. 59. The title :reaJs, "'Of Donations Between Married Persons, Either by Mar-
riage Contract 'or During the Marriage." See.3 PLANIOL no. 3208,
60. Id. art. 1536. ..LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1586 (1870).
61, Id. art. 174.:
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Reciprocal Donations
Article 1751 of the Civil Code provides that reciprocal inter.
spousal donations inter vivos or mortis causa may not be made
by one and the same act.6 2 French writers indicate that the
purpose of this requirement is to preserve the power to revoke
the donation.3 However, since all interspousal donations dur-
ing marriage are now irrevocable unless the contrary is stip-
ulated, 4 the utility of applying article 1751 to donations inter
vivos no longer seems to exist. The prohibition appears more
apposite, however, to donations mortis causa, as wills are nor-
mally kept by the testator or his representative so that altera-
tions may be made at any times. Such changes and revocations
would be difficult if both wills were included in the same act.65
Revocability
Although the rules pertaining to donations during marriage
are essentially the same as those applicable to interspousal dona-
tions by marriage contract, the revocability of donations of
future and of present and future property made during marriage
needs additional consideration. Prior to 1942 all donations inter
vivos made during marriage were revocable at the will of the
parties.6 6 A donation of future property is a donation inter
vivos.6 7 Therefore, a donation of future property made during
marriage was revocable. However, a conflict appeared to exist,
since the code articles applying to donations by third parties to
spouses were deemed applicable to interspousal donations
through article 1745. Article 1736, applied to interspousal dona-
tions during marriage, would render such donations irrevocable
in the sense that the donor could not gratuitously dispose of the
objects comprised in the donation. On the other hand, under
article 1749 such donations were totally revocable. Conceivably,
article 1749 was not designed to apply to donations of future or
of present and future property but was intended as an exception
to the usual irrevocability of donations applying to donations of
present property only. If so, no conflict would exist. In France,
however, the equivalent to article 1749 is interpreted as applying
62. Id. art. 1751.
63. See, e.g., 3 PLANiOL no. 3215.
64. LA. R.S. 9:2351 (1950).
65. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1572 (1870).
66. Id. art. 1749.
"67. Certainly this is true at least insofar as form is concerned. See 3 PLANIOL
no. 3158.
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to all types of donations between the spouses, which makes the
conflict real."" The French resolve it by simply letting the rule
of article 1749 control, believing that the power of revocation of
donations during marriage should be preserved, article 1736
notwithstanding 9
Any conflict that might have existed in Louisiana seems to
be resolved by the repeal of article 1749 and enactment of R.S.
9:2351 making donations between spouses irrevocable as if made
to a stranger. This usually means, of course, that the donation
is absolutely irrevocable. This provision, however, does not
affect the revocability of donations of future property by oner-
ous disposition, since a donation of future property to a stranger
cannot be made at all except in the stranger's marriage con-
tract 70 and hence would be governed by article 1736. R.S. 9:2351
simply makes article 1736 apply to such donations between
spouses since it is the only provision of the Code governing
revocability of donations of future property. Thus all donations
during marriage now seem to be in harmony with article 1736.
Article 156 of the Civil Code provides that the party against
whom a judgment of separation is pronounced will lose all dona-
tions made to him by marriage contract or since. Consequently,
although the right to revoke is not reserved the donee may still
lose the donation by operation of law.
Disposable Portion
As last amended in 1916, article 1752 provides that the quan-
tum which a spouse may give to the other where the donor has
children of a prior marriage, is "all of that portion of his . . .
estate . . . that he . . . could legally give to a stranger." The
quantum is the same as the disposable portion in any Other cir-
cumstances but the result of an excessive donation differs.
Ordinarily excessive donations are simply reducible. 71 Such is
not the case for excessive donations governed by article 1752;
neither is it quite so simple. Under the second paragraph of
68. 5 PLANIOL ET RIPERT, TRAITIt PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANVAIS no 777
(2d ed. 1957).
69. ibid.
70. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1528 (1870).
71. Id. art. 1502: "Any disposal of property, whether inter vivo8 or maortis
causa, exceeding the quantum of which a person may legally dispose to the
prejudice of the forced heirs, is not null, but only reducible to that quaatum."
Succession of May, 109 La. 994, 34 So. 52 (1903).
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article 175472 it is clear that donations between spouses made
in disguise or through a person interposed are null and void. Pre-
sumably, if the donation is not disguised or made through an in-
terposed person, it is valid, but reducible if it exceeds the dis-
posable portion. The language of the first paragraph presents
a problem, however, as it provides: "Husbands and wives can
not give to each other, indirectly, beyond what is permitted by
the foregoing dispositions." What is the exact status of the
donation made "indirectly"? Is it possible to have an excessive
donation made indirectly that is not also made in disguise or
through a person interposed, and therefore not null, but only
reducible? The meager French jurisprudence 73 takes the posi-
tion that their equivalent of article 1754 contains two rules:
excessive donations made indirectly are merely reducible; those
made in disguise or through a person interposed are null. On
the other hand, Planiol 4 is of the opinion that the article con-
tains only one rule, stated generally in the first paragraph and
specifically in the second. According to this view the article
would read: "Indirect donations, i.e., those made in disguise
or through a person interposed, are null and void." Accordingly,
it would be impossible to have an indirect donation that would
only be reducible. The type of "indirect" donation found reduci-
ble by the French courts can perhaps be more properly termed a
quasi donation. It is an act by which one party relinquishes a
right to another person, for example, forgiving a debt.75 Loui-
siana courts have never decided whether an "indirect" donation
is something other than one in disguise or through a person
interposed and thus merely reducible. The only cases which have
arisen have concerned donations either open and direct but ex-
cessive,7 6 or either disguised or through a person interposed."7
The former was reducible; the latter, null. There is perhaps
some justification from the construction of the article itself for
treating it as divisible. The first paragraph seems to be con-
72. LA. CIvIL CODE art. 1754: "Husbands and wives can not give to each
other, indirectly, beyond what is permitted by the foregoing dispositions.
"All donations disguised, or made to persons interposed, shall be null a'nd
void."
73. See 12 ]3AUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET COLIN, TRAITt THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE
DE DROIT CIVIL n* 4104 (12th ed. 1905); 4 TROPLONO, DROIT CIVIL EXPLIQUt
n? 2742 (3d ed. 1872).
74. 3 PLANIOL no. 3252.
75. Id. nos. 2546, 2547.
76. Succession of May, 109 La. 994, 34 So. 52 (1903).
77. Thibodeaux v. Herpin, 6 La. Ann. 673 (1851) ; cf. LA. CIVIL CODE art.
1755 (1870).
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cerned only with the excessive portion while the second strikes
with nullity the entire donation. Furthermore, absent fraud or
disguise, why should the whole donation fall? Since the prohibi-
tion seems to extend only to what is "beyond" the disposable
portion, it appears that purely indirect donations (whatever
that is) should only be reduced. On the other hand, the French
commentators explain that the article should be considered to
contain only one rule, thus making either type donation therein
mentioned null, to provide a sanction against such donations in
order to preserve the power of revocation during marriage. 8
Consequently, a disguised donation, that is, a simulated sale
which would not otherwise be revocable, can be annulled and
thus brought back into the donor's estate as if he had revoked
the donation. The French seem to want to preserve the donor-
spouse's power of revocation whether he wants it or not. Viewed
in this light, the article seems clearly to contain only one rule:
indirect donations, those made in disguise or through a person
interposed, are null. Since Louisiana no longer allows revocation
of donations during marriage as a general rule, 79 it appears that
article 1754, so interpreted, has outlived its usefulness. It should
be amended to provide only for the reduction of excessive dona-
tions made indirectly. Since article 1752 is now in line with
articles 1493 and 1494,80 so far as the quantum is concerned,
such an amendment would bring article 1754 into harmony with
article 1502, 81 and a uniform treatment of excessive donations
would result.
Capacity to Donate
It is well settled that the husband may make a valid donation
of community movables or immovables to the wife, which become
her separate property.8 2 The donation is valid because the wife
alone has the right to complain of a violation of article 2404,
forbidding the husband from making certain donations of com-
78. See 3 PLANIOL ET RI PERT, TRAIT PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANQAIS DO
762 (2d ed. 1957).
79. See text at notes 54 through 56 supra.
80. Compare LA CIVIL CODE art. 1752 (1870) with id. arts. 1493 and 1494.
81. Id. art. 1502, quoted in note 71 supra.
82. Id. art. 2334: ". . . Separate property is that which either party brings
into the marriage, or acquires during the marriage with separate funds, or by
inheritance, or by donation made to him particularly . .. ."
For donations of community property to the wife, see Coney v. Coney, 220
La. 473, 56 So. 2d 841 (1952); Succession of Byrnes, 206 La. 1026, 20 So. 2d
301 (1944) ; Succession of Bendel, 116 So. 2d 84 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959).
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munity property,88 and when she consents the donation is valid 4
May the wife make similar donations to the husband? The wife
normally has no active control of the community property, 5 can
not make gifts out of community property to a stranger, and
thus should not be able to give to her husband. However, if the
husband designates his wife as agent for the community," or if
he accepts the gift indicating a ratification of her actions, it
seems the donation may be valid. Further, a donation by the
wife to the husband of future property will ordinarily include
some or all of her share in the community. To that extent she
is donating community property without any special authoriza-
tion. Although there are situations in which the wife might
make a donation of community property to the husband, the
courts may decide that article 2404 is controlling and deny the
wife such a power.8 7
Redonation
It has been held on two occasions88 that where the husband
has made a donation to his wife of community property, any
redonation of the property, or the fruits thereof, to the husband
by the wife will be treated as a revocation of the donation by
the husband, which returns the property to its community status
rather than making it the husband's separate property. Al-
though it is conceded that an outright revocation by the husband
would have this effect, it is doubtful that a donation by the wife
of anything but the exact property donated to her should be so
treated. In Cousin v. St. Tammany Bank & Trust Co.,89 the hus-
band donated cash and a small business, both community prop-
erty, to the wife. Profits from the business, which was operated
solely by the wife, were used by her to buy a small piece of land
in her own name. Sometime later, the husband wished to borrow
money from the defendant bank and wanted to use the property
83. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2404 (1870) : "The husband . . . can make no convey-
ance inter vivos, by a gratuitous title, of the immovables of the community, nor
of the whole, or of a quota of the movables, unless it be for the establishment of
the children of the marriage .... "
84. Succession of Williams, 171 La. 151, 129 So. 801 (1930).
85. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2404 (1870) : "The husband is the head and master
of the partnership or community of gains .... Reccaforte v. Barbin, 212 La. 69,
31 So. 2d 521 (1947) ; Preston v. Humphreys, 5 Rob. 299 (La. 1843).
86. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 695 (1960).
87. But cf. Bernard v. Noel, 45 La. Ann. 1135, 13 So. 737 (1893).
88. Cousin v. St. Tammany Bank & Trust Co., 146 La. 393, 83 So. 685
(1919) ; Succession of Johnson, 8 So. 2d 139 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1942).
89. 146 La. 393, 83 So. 685 (1919).
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purchased by the wife as security. Doubtful that the property
was a community asset, the bank had the wife "donate" the lot
to the husband and join with him in granting the mortgage
before it would approve the loan. The husband defaulted and
the bank attempted to have the property seized and sold to
satisfy the debt. The wife then sued to enjoin the seizure and
sale on the grounds it was her separate property and could not
be sold to satisfy her husband's debt.90 The court denied her
claim, holding that the wife's redonation at the request of the
bank amounted to a revocation by the husband, returning the
property to the community. The wife could not then revoke her
donation, as seemed to be her object, for the husband as head
and master of the community had complete control of its prop-
erties.9 1 Thus it could be used to satisfy the debt.
While the result may be proper on a theory of estoppel, 92 the
holding seems both confusing and unnecessary. In the first
place, the revocation was entirely fictional. In the second place,
the property "redonated" by the wife was not the property first
donated by the husband or the fruits thereof. In fact, it was
property bought by the wife with her separate funds which
were derived from the operation of the business by her per-
sonally. It is difficult to understand how the donation by the
wife could be treated as a revocation by the husband of his gift,
since he did not give her the property in question. Had it been
the same property, the decision may well have been correct;
however, it is doubtful that it could be applied today to a similar
situation. Since R.S. 9:2351 makes interspousal donations irre-
90. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2403 (1870): "In the same manner, the debts con-
tracted during the marriage enter into the partnership or community of gains, and
must be acquitted out of the common fund, whilst the debts of both husband and
wife, anterior to the marriage, must be acquitted out of their own personal and
individual effects." From this article it seems clear that a debt of the husband,
whether it is his own personal debt or one of the community, must be satisfied
out of community funds. In any event he cannot use the wife's separate property.
See Comment, 25 LA. LAW REV. 201 (1965).
91. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2404 (1870).
92. Inasmuch as the wife actually joined in signing the act of mortgage, she
should not be now heard to complain of the encumbrance, particularly since the
bank has relied on it and granted the loan.
93. Prior to the amendment of La. Civil Code article 2386 in 1944, the fruits
of the wife's paraphernal property (the retail store in this case) fell into the
partnership only if administered by the husband. Since the husband had nothing
at all to do with the operation of his wife's business it follows that at the time
this case arose all the profits from the store became the wife's separate property.
Consequently she could easily have established that the lot in question was her
separate property as it was bought with her own funds and was in her name. In
short, it was a totally different piece of property than that which had been
donated to her 'by her husband.
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vocable,94 it hardly seems likely that a court will recognize a
fictitious revocation when it can not recognize a real one. Thus
such a donation by the wife today would seem to fall into the
husband's separate estate.9 5
ONEROUS TRANSACTIONS
Historical Development
Although onerous contracts between spouses were not pro-
hibited under Spanish law,"" the Louisiana Civil Code of 1808
prohibited interspousal sales,97 properly so called, and the Civil
Code of 1825 struck down all interspousal contracts.98 The pro-
hibition extended also to any alterations of the marriage con-
tract after the celebration of the marriage. 9 The purpose of
this doctrine was two-fold: to protect the wife from an abuse
of marital power by the husband and to protect creditors from
being defrauded by contracts between the spouses. 100 The Code
of 1870 continued the policy of general contractual incapacity, 10
excepting certain transactions.
Permitted Transfers
Article 2446 forbids all sales between spouses but enumerates
three situations in which property transfers are possible .102
94. See note 54 supra.
95. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2334 (1870) : "Separate property is that which either
party .- . . acquires during the marriage . . . by donation made to him or her
particularly .... "
96. LAS SIETE PARTIDAS pt. 5, tit. 11, L. 4; pt. 5, tit. 5, L. 2 (1263) ; see
Labbe's Heirs v. Abot, 2 La. 553 (1831).
97. La. Civil Code p. 348, art. 15 (1808).
98. La. Civil Code art. 1784 (1825).
99. Id. art. 2309.
100. See Hellwig v. West, 2 La. Ann. 1 (1847).
101. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1790 (1870) : "Besides the general incapacity which
persons of certain descriptions are under, there are others applicable only to cer-
tain contracts, either in relation to the parties, such as a husband and wife,
tutor and ward, whose contracts with each other are forbidden; or in relation
to the subject of the contract, such as purchases, by the administrator, of any part
of the estate which is committed to his charge, and the incapacity of the wife,
even with the assent of the husband, to alienate her dotal property, or to become
security for his debts. These take place only in the cases specially provided by
law, under different titles of this code." (Emphasis added.)
102. Id. art. 2446: "A contract of sale, between husband and wife, can take
place only in the three following cases:
"1. When one of the spouses makes a transfer of property to the other, who is
judicially separated from him or her, in payment of his or her rights.
"2. When the transfer made by the husband to his wife, even though not
separated, has a legitimate cause, as the replacing of her dotal or other effects
alienated.
"8. When the wife makes a transfer of property to her husband, in payment
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Though designated "sales," the permitted transactions are in
reality examples of the dation en paiement, which article 2655
defines as "an act by which a debtor gives a thing to the creditor,
who is willing to receive it, in payment of a sum which is due.'
1 0 3
Furthermore, the prohibition of article 2446 applies to conven-
tional or private sales only, not to judicial or public sales. 10 4
The first permitted "sale" allows a spouse judicially sep-
arated to transfer property to the other in payment of his or
her rights. This provision has been interpreted to allow only a
settlement of the community. 0 5 It does not permit the parties
to set the amount of alimony the wife will receive after the
divorce. 0 1
The second transfer permitted by article 2446 is one by
husband to wife which has a "legitimate cause." This seemingly
all-inclusive, if vague, grant has been construed to allow only a
transfer of property to satisfy a debt owed the wife.107 If the
husband can prove, however, by parol evidence or other means
that he owed no debt to the wife at the time of the transfer, the
entire transaction will be annulled as one in fraudum legi8.10
To prove lack of indebtedness the husband must show that the
wife either had no separate funds or, if she did, that he never
borrowed any from her. 10 9 Similarly, the transaction may be
of a sum promised to him as a dowry.
"Saving, in these three cases, to the heirs of the contracting parties, their
rights, if there exist any indirect advantage."
103. Id. art. 2655 (1870). It should be noted that all the situations enumerated
in article 2446, quoted in note 102 supra, fall within the description of article
2655.
104. Brewer v. Brewer, 145 La. 835, 83 So. 30 (1919).
105. Russo v. Russo, 205 La. 852, 18 So. 2d 318 (1944).
106. Ibid.
107. Smith v. Smith, 239 La. 688, 119 So. 2d 827 (1960) ; Lehman Dry Goods
Co. v. Lemoine, 129 La. 382, 56 So. 324 (1911) ; Carroll v. Cockerham, 38 La.
Ann. 813 (1886); Thompson v. Freeman, 34 La. Ann. 992 (1882); Britto v.
Fabre, 34 La. Ann. 347 (1882) ; Kirkpatrick v. Finney, 30 La. Ann. 223 (1878)
Krauss Co. v. Godchaux, 13 La. App. 607, 128 So. 673 (Orl. Cir. 1930).
108. Smith v. Smith, 239 La. 688, 119 So. 2d 827 (1960). Since it would he
a fraud on the law to let the transfer stand where there is no indebtedness, parol
evidence is admissible even though a written instrument is involved. Smith also
indicates that parol evidence may be used to invalidate other transfers not con-
forming to LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2446 (1870).
This decision is questioned in Note, 21 LA. L. REV. 680 (1961), wherein it is
pointed out that donations between husband and wife are not prohibited and that
the in jraudem legis exception to the parol evidence rule should be applied only
where the purpose is to show that the transfer in question was intended as a
forbidden one, e.g., a sale, a donation omnium bonorum, or donation to a con-
cubine.
109. Smith v. Smith, 239 La. 688, 119 So. 827 (1960).
[Vol. XXV
COMMENTS
attacked by the husband's forced heirs or his creditors.110 In all
cases the burden of proof is on the person seeking to show the
lack of indebtedness."' To the extent a debt exists, however,
the husband may transfer property to the wife to the prejudice
of his other creditors. 1 2 Any property so transferred becomes
the wife's separate property and not subject to seizure for the
husband's debts"13 unless burdened by a mortgage at the time
of the transfer," 4 in which case only such property may be sold
to satisfy the debt. The wife will not be personally liable." 5
The third transfer is practically the reverse of the above;
the wife may transfer property to the husband in payment of a
sum promised him as dowry. There is no jurisprudence concern-
ing this type of transaction.
In order for any of the above dations to be valid they must
meet three tests: there must be a real indebtedness; the value
of the property transferred must not exceed the amount owed;
and the property must be delivered." 6 In connection with this
last requirement, it has been held that a transfer of property
in which a right of redemption was reserved by the transferor
for a specified period was not fully translative of title and con-
sequently did not constitute delivery.117 Without delivery the
dation was null from the outset and did not gain validity by the
expiration of the redemption period and the inaction of the
transferor. The decision has been criticized" 8 but never re-
pudiated.
110. Kelly v. Kelly, 131 La. 1024, 60 So. 671 (1913).
111. See note 107 supra.
112. Lehman Dry Goods Co. v. Lemoine, 129 La. 382, 56 So. 324 (1911).
113. Barus v. Bidwell, 23 La. Ann. 163 (1871).
114. Levi v. Morgan, 33 La. Ann. 532 (1881). Presumably this rule applies
only to a recorded mortgage. See LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2264 (1870) ; McDuffie v.
Walker, 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1910).
115. See note 90 supra.
116. Miller v. Miller, 234 La. 883, 102 So.2d 52 (1958) ; Colvin v. Johnson,
104 La. 655, 29 So. 274 (1901) ; Krauss Co. v. Godchaux, 13 La. App. 607, 128
So. 673 (Orl. Cir. 1930) ; see also LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2656 (1870).
117. Miller v. Miller, 234 La. 883, 102 So.2d 52 (1958).
118. Alternative positions were available to the court, and each has some
appeal. Justice Simon, on the original hearing in the cause, felt that since the
period for redemption had expired, it was as though it had never been written,
so it could be said that title vested absolutely in the wife. Id. at 890, 102 So.2d
at 54. In dissenting from the opinion on rehearing, the same Justice proposed
that since the redemptive period makes the transfer invalid, only that portion of
the agreement should fall, leaving the rest of the act valid. Id. at 905, 102 So.2d
at 59. In advancing this latter argument, reliance was placed on LA. CIVIL CODE
art. 1519 (1870), which strikes from donations inter vivos impossible conditions,
or those which are contrary to the laws or to morals. However, it is suggested
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Save in the above transactions, no onerous contracts between
spouses are permitted, 119 and what is not permitted directly
cannot be accomplished indirectly. Thus a sale by a husband
to a third party who then sells the property to the wife is null.120
There are, however, a number of other interspousal con-
tracts which, though not expressly classed as exceptions to the
general incapacity, are actually exceptions. These are, in addi-
tion to donations, 121 an agreement to re-establish the communi-
ty after a separation from bed and board ;122 a contract of man-
date whereby the husband assumes the administration of the
wife's paraphernal property,123 or one in which the wife becomes
agent for the husband or for the community ;124 a contract where-
in husband and wife join on one side of an agreement with a
third party on the other side, as in certain mineral leases ;12- and
an agreement for the wife to act as surety for her husband. 126 Al-
though generally incapable of contracting with each other,'127
the parties may after divorce ratify some agreements which they
were not capable of making during marriage. In this sense in-
capacity is only relative, not absolute.2 8
Actions To Annul
Actions to annul onerous transactions between husband and
wife not falling within one of the exceptions of article 2446
that article 1519 has no application, since there is nothing inherently contrary to
law or good morals about a redemptive period.
119. Little v. Barbe, 195 La. 1071, 190 So. 368 (1940) ; Hayden v. Nutt, 4 La.
Ann. 65 (1849) ; Neal v. Locke, 61 So.2d 232 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1952). Not only
are the transfers invalid as sales, but also they cannot form the basis for a
prescriptive title.
120. Succession of Lewis, 157 So.2d 321 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1963) ; see also
Douglass v. Douglass, 51 La. Ann. 1455, 26 So. 546 (1899), where the wife was
the vendor to an interposed party who then sold to the husband.
121. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1743 (1870).
122. Id. art. 155: "Separation from bed and board carries with it separation
of goods and effects. Upon reconciliation of the spouses, the community may be re-
established by husband and wife jointly, as of the date of the filing of the suit for
separation from bed and board, by an act before a notary and two witnesses . ... "
123. Id. art. 2387: "The wife who has left to her husband the administration
of her paraphernal property, may afterwards withdraw it from him." Presumably
the wife stipulates some conditions for the administration of her property to which
the husband agrees; that she may terminate it at will does not make it any less
a contract.
124. LA. CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE art. 695 (1960).
125. See, e.g., Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Calcasieu Real Estate & Oil Co., 185
La. 751, 170 So. 785 (1936). The case contains a good analysis why this type of
contract between husband and wife should be permitted.
126. LA. R.S. 9:103 (1950).
127. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1790 (1870) ; Sonnier v. Fris, 220 La. 1085, 58 So.2d
393 (1952) ; Sheard v. Green, 219 La. 199, 52 So.2d 714 (1951) ; Succession of
Tullier, 53 So.2d 455 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1951).
128. Dares v. O'Donnell, 151 So. 774 (La. App. Orl. Cir. 1934).
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may be brought by one of the spouses, the forced heirs, or credi-
tors.1 29 This action is not subject to prescription since the trans-
action is null ab initio.13° A transfer which on its face seems to
conform to article 2446, but which in reality does not, is also
null.13' If it fails to conform because the recited debt does not
exist or because there was no intent to transfer, the entire trans-
action falls. 32 On the other hand, if the debt actually exists but
the value of the property transferred exceeds the amount of the
debt, the transfer will only be reduced.13 3 Creditors bringing
this action do not have to allege the debtor's insolvency as the
revocatory action requires. 134 In fact, to the extent the debt
owed the wife is legitimate, the transfer is excepted from the
rules governing the revocatory action and the creditors have
no action at all. Thus the husband may, even if insolvent, prefer
the wife's claim to the prejudice of his other creditors. 135
Policy considerations present at the initiation of the ban
on interspousal contracts seem equally valid today. The pro-
hibition of the law is founded on the consideration that other-
wise it would be very easy for the spouses, by simulated sales,
to make donations exceeding the disposable portion or to with-
draw their property from the pursuit of their respective credi-
tors.1 36 The prohibition is made, therefore, to prevent fraud on
the children of the marriage and creditors of the respective
spouses. The ban also serves to protect the husband or wife, as
the case may be, in their property rights against undue influence
and imposition.'3 7
STANFORD 0. BARDWELL, JR.
129. See Kelly v. Kelly, 131 La. 1024, 60 So. 671 (1913).
130. Smith v. Taylor, 226 La. 235, 75 So.2d 850 (1954).
131. See, e.g., Smith v. Smith, 239 La. 688, 119 So.2d 827 (1960).
132. Smith v. Smith, 239 La. 688, 119 So.2d 827 (1960) ; Succession of Miller
v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 110 La. 652, 34 So. 723 (1903) ; Neal v. Locke, 61
So.2d 232 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1952).
133. Lehman Dry Goods Co. v. Lemoine, 129 La. 382, 56 So. 324 (1911)
Carroll v. Cockerham, 38 La. Ann. 813 (1886).
134. LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1970, 1971 (1870) ; Pelletier v. State Nat'l Bank,
117 La. 335, 41 So. 640 (1906).
135. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 1983 (1870); Lehman Dry Goods Co. v. Lemoine,
129 La. 382, 56 So. 324 (1911); W. B. Thompson & Co. v. Freeman, 34 La.
Ann. 992 (1882) ; Lehman, Abraham & Co. v. Levy, 30 La. Ann. 745 (1878).
136. Kelly v. Kelly, 131 La. 1024, 60 So. 671 (1913).
137. Ibid.
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